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Author (up) Colini-Baldeschi, R.; Cominetti, R.; Mertikopoulos, P.; Scarsini, M.
Title When Is Selfish Routing Bad? The Price of Anarchy in Light and Heavy Traffic Type
Year 2020 Publication Operations Research Abbreviated Journal Oper. Res.
Volume 68 Issue 2 Pages 411-434
Keywords nonatomic congestion games; price of anarchy; light traffic; heavy traffic; regular variation
Abstract This paper examines the behavior of the price of anarchy as a function of the traffic inflow in nonatomic congestion games with multiple origin/destination (O/D) pairs. Empirical studies in real-world networks show that the price of anarchy is close to 1 in both light and heavy traffic, thus raising the following question: can these observations be justified theoretically? We first show that this is not always the case: the price of anarchy may remain a positive distance away from 1 for all values of the traffic inflow, even in simple three-link networks with a single O/D pair and smooth, convex costs. On the other hand, for a large class of cost functions (including all polynomials) and inflow patterns, the price of anarchy does converge to 1 in both heavy and light traffic, irrespective of the network topology and the number of O/D pairs in the network. We also examine the rate of convergence of the price of anarchy, and we show that it follows a power law whose degree can be computed explicitly when the network's cost functions are polynomials.
Address [Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo] Facebook Inc, Core Data Sci Grp, London W1T 1FB, England, Email: rickuz@fb.com;
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Informs Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0030-364x ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000521730200006 Approved
Call Number UAI @ eduardo.moreno @ Serial 1128
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Author (up) Colini-Baldeschi, R.; Cominetti, R.; Scarsini, M.
Title Price of Anarchy for Highly Congested Routing Games in Parallel Networks Type
Year 2019 Publication Theory Of Computing Systems Abbreviated Journal Theor. Comput. Syst.
Volume 63 Issue 1 Pages 90-113
Keywords Nonatomic routing games; Price of Anarchy; Regularly varying functions; Wardrop equilibrium; Parallel networks; High congestion
Abstract We consider nonatomic routing games with one source and one destination connected by multiple parallel edges. We examine the asymptotic behavior of the price of anarchy as the inflow increases. In accordance with some empirical observations, we prove that under suitable conditions on the costs the price of anarchy is asymptotic to one. We show with some counterexamples that this is not always the case, and that these counterexamples already occur in simple networks with only 2 parallel links.
Address [Colini-Baldeschi, Riccardo; Scarsini, Marco] LUISS, Dipartimento Econ & Finanza, Viale Romania 32, I-00197 Rome, Italy, Email: rcolini@luiss.it;
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Springer Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1432-4350 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000456320200005 Approved
Call Number UAI @ eduardo.moreno @ Serial 974
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