| Records |
Author  |
Carrasco, J.A..; Yanez, R. |
| Title |
Sequential search and firm prominence |
Type |
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| Year |
2022 |
Publication |
Economic Theory |
Abbreviated Journal |
Econ. Theory |
| Volume |
74 |
Issue |
1 |
Pages |
209-233 |
| Keywords |
EQUILIBRIUM PRICE DISPERSION; CONSUMER SEARCH; INFORMATION; ECONOMICS; MODEL |
| Abstract |
We explore the role of prominence in equilibrium pricing in markets where search is sequential and random. Our model key feature is that more prominent firms are more likely to be sampled first. In contrast to ordered-search models, we find that more prominent firms inherit larger but less elastic demands, and as such have incentives to post larger prices. However, they might post lower prices but still charge higher markups than less prominent competitors only if they are also sufficiently more efficient. Our results suggest that when search is sequential, the role of prominence depends on whether it modifies the order or just the chances with which firms are sampled. |
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Place of Publication |
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Editor |
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| Language |
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Original Title |
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| Series Editor |
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Series Title |
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Abbreviated Series Title |
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| Series Volume |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
0938-2259 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
WOS:000647491800002 |
Approved |
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| Call Number |
UAI @ alexi.delcanto @ |
Serial |
1373 |
| Permanent link to this record |
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| Author |
Carrasco, J.A.; Carrasco, M.; Yanez, R. |
| Title |
An inexpert expert |
Type |
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| Year |
2022 |
Publication |
Applied Economics Letters |
Abbreviated Journal |
Appl. Econ. Lett. |
| Volume |
Early Access |
Issue |
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Pages |
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| Keywords |
Cheap talk; bias; informativeness; noise |
| Abstract |
We explore strategic information transmission when there is noise at the observation stage, when an expert observes signals, before he advises a policymaker. That is, the expert might be inexpert. We account for the fact that his signals might be totally uninformative, which is commonly known by players. We find that this inexpertise translates into a greater preference misalignment between players and that this yields a less informative equilibrium. We show that our results follow from the fact that the strategic effect of noise – the welfare change exclusive due to changes in the equilibrium partition – is always negative. Numerical simulations show that noise might be beneficial if the policymaker openly disagrees about noise chances. This makes the point that whether noise is beneficial or not crucially depends on how early in the game it arises, and also whether noise chances are commonly known by players or not. |
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Original Title |
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Abbreviated Series Title |
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Series Issue |
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Edition |
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| ISSN |
1350-4851 |
ISBN |
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Medium |
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| Area |
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Expedition |
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Conference |
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| Notes |
WOS:000827531200001 |
Approved |
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| Call Number |
UAI @ alexi.delcanto @ |
Serial |
1618 |
| Permanent link to this record |
