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Author Bottcher, L.; Montealegre, P.; Goles, E.; Gersbach, H.
Title Competing activists-Political polarization Type
Year 2020 Publication Physica A-Statistical Mechanics And Its Applications Abbreviated Journal Physica A
Volume 545 Issue Pages 13 pp
Keywords Political polarization; Opinion formation; Activists; Markov chains; Game theory
Abstract Recent empirical findings suggest that societies have become more polarized in various countries. That is, the median voter of today represents a smaller fraction of society compared to two decades ago and yet, the mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are not fully understood. Since interactions between influential actors ("activists'') and voters play a major role in opinion formation, e.g. through social media, we develop a macroscopic opinion model in which competing activists spread their political ideas in specific groups of society. These ideas spread further to other groups in declining strength. While unilateral spreading shifts the opinion distribution, competition of activists leads to additional phenomena: Small heterogeneities among competing activists cause them to target different groups in society, which amplifies polarization. For moderate heterogeneities, we obtain target cycles and further amplification of polarization. In such cycles, the stronger activist differentiates himself from the weaker one, while the latter aims to imitate the stronger activist. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Address [Boettcher, Lucas] Swiss Fed Inst Technol, Inst Theoret Phys, CH-8093 Zurich, Switzerland, Email: lucasb@ethz.ch
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Elsevier Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0378-4371 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000526845600034 Approved
Call Number UAI @ eduardo.moreno @ Serial 1147
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Author Kristiansen, M.; Munoz, F.D.; Oren, S.; Korpas, M.
Title A Mechanism for Allocating Benefits and Costs from Transmission Interconnections under Cooperation: A Case Study of the North Sea Offshore Grid Type
Year 2018 Publication Energy Journal Abbreviated Journal Energy J.
Volume 39 Issue 6 Pages 209-234
Keywords Cooperative game theory; Cost-benefit allocation; Transmission expansion planning
Abstract We propose a generic mechanism for allocating the benefits and costs that result from the development of international transmission interconnections under a cooperative agreement. The mechanism is based on a planning model that considers generation investments as a response to transmission developments, and the Shapley Value from cooperative game theory. This method provides a unique allocation of benefits and costs considering each country's average incremental contribution to the cooperative agreement. The allocation satisfies an axiomatic definition of fairness. We demonstrate our results for three planned transmission interconnections in the North Sea and show that the proposed mechanism can be used as a basis for defining a set of Power Purchase Agreements among countries. This achieves the desired final distribution of economic benefits and costs from transmission interconnections as countries trade power over time. We also show that, in this case, the proposed allocation is stable.
Address [Kristiansen, Martin; Korpas, Magnus] Norwegian Univ Sci & Technol, Dept Elect Power Engn, Trondheim, Norway, Email: martin.kristiansen@ntnu.no
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Int Assoc Energy Economics Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0195-6574 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000447750400010 Approved
Call Number UAI @ eduardo.moreno @ Serial 922
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