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Author Quinteros, M.J.; Villena, M.J.
Title On the Dynamics and Stability of the Crime and Punishment Game Type
Year 2022 Publication Complexity Abbreviated Journal Complexity
Volume 2022 Issue Pages 2449031
Keywords CORRUPTION; LAW
Abstract We study the dynamics and stability of the economics of crime and punishment game from an evolutionary perspective. Specifically, we model the interaction between agents and controllers as an asymmetric game exploring the dynamics of the classic static model using a replicator dynamics equation, given exogenous levels of monitoring and criminal sanctions. The dynamics show five possible equilibria, from which three are stable. Our results show that a culture of honest agents is never stable; however when the penalty is high enough, the system will neutrally tend to an equilibrium of honest agents and a monitoring firm. By contrast, when the probability of detecting wrongdoing is small, the system, in some cases, will remain in a transient state, in which it is impossible to predict the proportion of honest agents.
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Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1076-2787 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000773704800003 Approved
Call Number UAI @ alexi.delcanto @ Serial 1556
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Author Quinteros, M.J.; Villena, M.J.; Villena, M.G.
Title An evolutionary game theoretic model of whistleblowing behaviour in organizations Type
Year 2022 Publication IMA Journal of Management Mathematics Abbreviated Journal IMA J. Manag. Math.
Volume 33 Issue 2 Pages 289-314
Keywords whistleblowing; corruption; social norms; evolutionary games; incentives
Abstract We present a theoretical model of corruption in organizations. Our specific focus is the role of incentives that aim to encourage whistleblowing behaviour. Corruption is modelled as a social norm of behaviour using evolutionary game theory. In particular, the dynamics of whistleblowing behaviour is captured using the replicator dynamics equation with constant and quadratic monitoring costs. We formally explore the local asymptotic stability of the equilibria. Our findings indicate that the traditional recommendations of the Beckerian approach are usually too expensive and/or unstable. We argue that an efficient mechanism for controlling corruption can be achieved by maintaining efficient salaries and imposing high rewards for whistleblowers when they detect wrongdoing. In the long term, employees can only be honest, or corrupt, or corrupt and whistleblowers; honest and whistleblowing behaviour will not coexist in the long run, since one of these two strategies is always dominated by the other.
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Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1471-678X ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000743926500006 Approved
Call Number UAI @ alexi.delcanto @ Serial 1528
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