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Author Bitran, E.; Rivera, P.; Villena, M.J.
Title Water management problems in the Copiapo Basin, Chile: markets, severe scarcity and the regulator Type
Year 2014 Publication Water Policy Abbreviated Journal Water Policy
Volume 16 Issue 5 Pages 844-863
Keywords Aquifers; Economic incentives; Regulations; Sustainable water management; Water markets
Abstract This research focuses on the determination of the factors that led to the failure of water management in the Copiapo Basin in Chile. Interestingly, the existence of full private ownership and free tradability of water rights has not prevented the overexploitation of groundwater resources. In the paper, firstly, water regulation and the role of the regulator in Chile are briefly discussed. Secondly, the evolution of water resources in the Copiapo region is characterized and analyzed, and the granting of water use rights in the basin in the last 30 years is concisely described. Thirdly, we examine and analyze prices and quantities traded in the water market of the Copiapo region. We will argue that this crisis is a consequence first of failure in regulatory implementation and second of an extremely rigid regulatory framework that leaves limited room for adjustment to changing conditions, especially regarding the emergence of new information concerning water availability. We believe this investigation is not only relevant for this case in particular, but also for other regions and countries where water markets are in place.
Address [Bitran, Eduardo; Villena, Marcelo J.] Univ Adolfo Ibanez, Fac Engn & Sci, Santiago, Chile, Email: marcelo.villena@uai.cl
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Iwa Publishing Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1366-7017 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000349029200005 Approved
Call Number UAI @ eduardo.moreno @ Serial 449
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Author Quinteros, M.J.; Villena, M.J.; Villena, M.G.
Title An evolutionary game theoretic model of whistleblowing behaviour in organizations Type
Year 2022 Publication IMA Journal of Management Mathematics Abbreviated Journal IMA J. Manag. Math.
Volume 33 Issue 2 Pages 289-314
Keywords whistleblowing; corruption; social norms; evolutionary games; incentives
Abstract We present a theoretical model of corruption in organizations. Our specific focus is the role of incentives that aim to encourage whistleblowing behaviour. Corruption is modelled as a social norm of behaviour using evolutionary game theory. In particular, the dynamics of whistleblowing behaviour is captured using the replicator dynamics equation with constant and quadratic monitoring costs. We formally explore the local asymptotic stability of the equilibria. Our findings indicate that the traditional recommendations of the Beckerian approach are usually too expensive and/or unstable. We argue that an efficient mechanism for controlling corruption can be achieved by maintaining efficient salaries and imposing high rewards for whistleblowers when they detect wrongdoing. In the long term, employees can only be honest, or corrupt, or corrupt and whistleblowers; honest and whistleblowing behaviour will not coexist in the long run, since one of these two strategies is always dominated by the other.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 1471-678X ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000743926500006 Approved
Call Number UAI @ alexi.delcanto @ Serial 1528
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Author Villalobos, C.; Negrete-Pincetic, M.; Figueroa, N.; Lorca, A.; Olivares, D.
Title The impact of short-term pricing on flexible generation investments in electricity markets Type
Year 2021 Publication Energy Economics Abbreviated Journal Energy Econ.
Volume 98 Issue Pages 105213
Keywords Electricity markets; Pricing schemes; Market incentives; Flexibility; Renewable energy
Abstract The massive growth in the integration of variable renewable energy sources is producing several challenges in the operation of power systems and its associated markets. In this context, flexibility has become a critical attribute to allow the system to react to changes in generation or demand levels. Thus, it is critical for market signals at both short and long term scales to include flexibility features, to align agents' incentives with systemic flexibility requirements. In this paper, different pricing schemes for short-term markets are studied, based on various relaxations of the unit commitment problem, including convex-hull approximations, with the aim of representing operational flexibility requirements in a more explicit way. Extensive simulations illustrate the performance of the proposed schemes, as compared to conventional ones, in terms of the capability of the system to properly incentivize flexibility attributes, resulting in better agents' cost recovery and more variable renewable energy utilization. The results show that short-term pricing schemes considered improve the long-term signals for flexible investments but additional changes to market design are still required. Thus, there is a need to revisit historical practices for pricing rules by incorporating additional flexibility-related attributes into them. Several alternatives are discussed and policy recommendations based on these considerations are provided.
Address
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Place of Publication Editor
Language Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 0140-9883 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000659334500023 Approved
Call Number UAI @ alexi.delcanto @ Serial 1401
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