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Author Carrasco, J.A.; Carrasco, M.; Yanez, R. doi  openurl
  Title An inexpert expert Type
  Year 2022 Publication Applied Economics Letters Abbreviated Journal Appl. Econ. Lett.  
  Volume Early Access Issue Pages  
  Keywords Cheap talk; bias; informativeness; noise  
  Abstract We explore strategic information transmission when there is noise at the observation stage, when an expert observes signals, before he advises a policymaker. That is, the expert might be inexpert. We account for the fact that his signals might be totally uninformative, which is commonly known by players. We find that this inexpertise translates into a greater preference misalignment between players and that this yields a less informative equilibrium. We show that our results follow from the fact that the strategic effect of noise – the welfare change exclusive due to changes in the equilibrium partition – is always negative. Numerical simulations show that noise might be beneficial if the policymaker openly disagrees about noise chances. This makes the point that whether noise is beneficial or not crucially depends on how early in the game it arises, and also whether noise chances are commonly known by players or not.  
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  ISSN 1350-4851 ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes WOS:000827531200001 Approved  
  Call Number UAI @ alexi.delcanto @ Serial 1618  
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