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Author (up) Carrasco, J.A.; Harrison, R.; Villena, M.
Title Interdependent preferences and endogenous reciprocity Type
Year 2018 Publication Journal Of Behavioral And Experimental Economics Abbreviated Journal J. Behav. Exp. Econ.
Volume 76 Issue Pages 68-75
Keywords Reciprocity; Endogenous preferences; Asymmetric evolutionary game
Abstract This paper employs an indirect approach to formally examine the evolutionary stability of interdependent preferences when players randomly engage in pairwise interactions. Following the model specification for altruism and spitefulness in experiments proposed by Levine (1998), we also explore the stability of reciprocity and reciprocal preferences. In particular, we study how individuals equipped with intrinsic preferences such as altruism, selfishness or spitefulness adjust their behavior depending on who they interact with. The key aspect of our method is that behavioral preferences are choice variables that optimally evolve, accounting for strategic interaction. Our model predicts that in a specific economic framework characterized by negative externalities and strategic substitutes, there is a continuum of evolutionary stable interdependent preference profiles: At least one player behaves spitefully, and at most one acts selfishly. The emergence of altruism as an evolutionarily stable preference crucially depends on how large the support for preferences is. When players have reciprocal preferences, altruism might arise even in meetings where one player is intrinsically spiteful, but not necessarily from the intrinsically altruistic player.
Address [Carrasco, Jose A.] Univ Adolfo Ibanez, Fac Ingn & Ciencias, 2640 Diagonal Las Torres, Santiago, Chile, Email: jose.carrasco@uai.cl;
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Elsevier Science Inc Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 2214-8043 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000445125300009 Approved
Call Number UAI @ eduardo.moreno @ Serial 914
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Author (up) Guzman, R.; Harrison, R.; Abarca, N.; Villena, M.G.
Title A game-theoretic model of reciprocity and trust that incorporates personality traits Type
Year 2020 Publication Journal Of Behavioral And Experimental Economics Abbreviated Journal J. Behav. Exp. Econ.
Volume 84 Issue Pages 11 pp
Keywords Reciprocity; Trust; Personality; Psychometrics; Revealed preferences
Abstract We propose a game-theoretic model of reciprocity and trust that incorporates personality traits. In the model, positive and negative reciprocity are “reciprocal preferences:” parameters of heterogeneous utility functions that take into account the material welfare of others (positively if they have been kind, negatively if they have been hostile). Trust, on the other hand, is an individual bias that distorts probabilistic beliefs about the trustworthiness of others. Unlike typical game-theoretic models, our model provides an explanation for the heterogeneity of preferences and probabilistic beliefs: a person's personality traits determine both the parameters of his utility function and the magnitude of his beleif bias. We tested the model experimentally. Subjects completed a psychometric questionnaire that measures three personality traits: positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, and trust. Subsequently, they played a sequential prisoner's dilemma with random re-matching and payoffs changing from round to round. From the subjects' psychometric scores and game behaviors we inferred the relationship between reciprocal preferences, belief biases, and personality. The results confirmed the hypotheses of the model.
Address [Guzman, Ricardo] Univ Desarrollo, Fac Gobierno, Concepcion, Chile, Email: mg.villena@gmail.com
Corporate Author Thesis
Publisher Elsevier Science Inc Place of Publication Editor
Language English Summary Language Original Title
Series Editor Series Title Abbreviated Series Title
Series Volume Series Issue Edition
ISSN 2214-8043 ISBN Medium
Area Expedition Conference
Notes WOS:000517586800011 Approved
Call Number UAI @ eduardo.moreno @ Serial 1118
Permanent link to this record