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Author (up) Quinteros, M.J.; Villena, M.J. doi  openurl
  Title On the Dynamics and Stability of the Crime and Punishment Game Type
  Year 2022 Publication Complexity Abbreviated Journal Complexity  
  Volume 2022 Issue Pages 2449031  
  Keywords CORRUPTION; LAW  
  Abstract We study the dynamics and stability of the economics of crime and punishment game from an evolutionary perspective. Specifically, we model the interaction between agents and controllers as an asymmetric game exploring the dynamics of the classic static model using a replicator dynamics equation, given exogenous levels of monitoring and criminal sanctions. The dynamics show five possible equilibria, from which three are stable. Our results show that a culture of honest agents is never stable; however when the penalty is high enough, the system will neutrally tend to an equilibrium of honest agents and a monitoring firm. By contrast, when the probability of detecting wrongdoing is small, the system, in some cases, will remain in a transient state, in which it is impossible to predict the proportion of honest agents.  
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  ISSN 1076-2787 ISBN Medium  
  Area Expedition Conference  
  Notes WOS:000773704800003 Approved  
  Call Number UAI @ alexi.delcanto @ Serial 1556  
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