On the Dynamics and Stability of the Crime and Punishment Game
Quinteros
M
J
author
Villena
M
J
author
2022
We study the dynamics and stability of the economics of crime and punishment game from an evolutionary perspective. Specifically, we model the interaction between agents and controllers as an asymmetric game exploring the dynamics of the classic static model using a replicator dynamics equation, given exogenous levels of monitoring and criminal sanctions. The dynamics show five possible equilibria, from which three are stable. Our results show that a culture of honest agents is never stable; however when the penalty is high enough, the system will neutrally tend to an equilibrium of honest agents and a monitoring firm. By contrast, when the probability of detecting wrongdoing is small, the system, in some cases, will remain in a transient state, in which it is impossible to predict the proportion of honest agents.
CORRUPTION
LAW
WOS:000773704800003
exported from refbase (show.php?record=1556), last updated on Thu, 21 Apr 2022 12:10:54 -0400
text
10.1155/2022/2449031
Quinteros+Villena2022
Complexity
Complexity
2022
continuing
periodical
academic journal
2022
2449031
1076-2787