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Chaigneau, S. E., Puebla, G., & Canessa, E. C. (2016). Why the designer's intended function is central for proper function assignment and artifact conceptualization: Essentialist and normative accounts. Dev. Rev., 41, 38–50.
Abstract: People tend to think that the function intended by an artifact's designer is its real or proper function. Relatedly, people tend to classify artifacts according to their designer's intended function (DIF), as opposed to an alternative opportunistic function. This centrality of DIF has been shown in children from 6 years of age to adults, and it is not restricted to Western societies. We review four different explanations for the centrality of DIF, integrating developmental and adult data. Two of these explanations are essentialist accounts (causal and intentional essentialism). Two of them are normative accounts (conventional function and idea ownership). Though essentialist accounts have been very influential, we review evidence that shows their limitations. Normative accounts have been less predominant. We review evidence to support them, and discuss how they account for the data. In particular, we review evidence suggesting that the centrality of DIF can be explained as a case of idea ownership. This theory makes sense of a great deal of the existing data on the subject, reconciles contradictory results, links this line of work to other literatures, and offers an account of the observed developmental trend. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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Canessa, E. C., & Chaigneau, S. E. (2016). When are concepts comparable across minds? Qual. Quant., 50(3), 1367–1384.
Abstract: In communication, people cannot resort to direct reference (e.g., pointing) when using diffuse concepts like democracy. Given that concepts reside in individuals' minds, how can people share those concepts? We argue that concepts are comparable across a social group if they afford agreement for those who use it; and that agreement occurs whenever individuals receive evidence that others conceptualize a given situation similarly to them. Based on Conceptual Agreement Theory, we show how to compute an agreement probability based on the sets of properties belonging to concepts. If that probability is sufficiently high, this shows that concepts afford an adequate level of agreement, and one may say that concepts are comparable across individuals' minds. In contrast to other approaches, our method considers that inter-individual variability in naturally occurring conceptual content exists and is a fact that must be taken into account, whereas other theories treat variability as error that should be cancelled out. Given that conceptual variability will exist, our approach may establish whether concepts are comparable across individuals' minds more soundly than previous methods.
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