Kristiansen, M., Munoz, F. D., Oren, S., & Korpas, M. (2018). A Mechanism for Allocating Benefits and Costs from Transmission Interconnections under Cooperation: A Case Study of the North Sea Offshore Grid. Energy J., 39(6), 209–234.
Abstract: We propose a generic mechanism for allocating the benefits and costs that result from the development of international transmission interconnections under a cooperative agreement. The mechanism is based on a planning model that considers generation investments as a response to transmission developments, and the Shapley Value from cooperative game theory. This method provides a unique allocation of benefits and costs considering each country's average incremental contribution to the cooperative agreement. The allocation satisfies an axiomatic definition of fairness. We demonstrate our results for three planned transmission interconnections in the North Sea and show that the proposed mechanism can be used as a basis for defining a set of Power Purchase Agreements among countries. This achieves the desired final distribution of economic benefits and costs from transmission interconnections as countries trade power over time. We also show that, in this case, the proposed allocation is stable.
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Varas, M., Basso, F., Bosch, P., Contreras, J. P., & Pezoa, R. (2022). A horizontal collaborative approach for planning the wine grape harvesting. Oper. Res., 22(5), 4965–4998.
Abstract: Horizontal collaboration is a strategy that has increasingly been used for improving supply chain operations. In this paper, we analyze the benefits of using a collaborative approach when optimally planning the wine grape harvesting process. Particularly, we assess how labor and machinery collaborative planning impacts harvesting costs. We model cooperation among wineries as a coalitional game with transferable costs for which the characteristic function vector is computed by solving a new formulation for planning the wine grape harvesting. In order to obtain stable coalitions, we devise an optimization problem that incorporates both rationality and efficiency conditions and uses the Gini index as a fairness criterion. Focusing on an illustrative case, we develop several computational experiments that show the positive effect of collaboration in the harvesting process. Moreover, our computational results reveal that the results depend strongly on the fairness criteria used. The Gini index, for example, favors the formation of smaller coalitions compared to other fairness criteria such as entropy.
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