Reus, L., & Mulvey, J. M. (2016). Dynamic allocations for currency futures under switching regimes signals. Eur. J. Oper. Res., 253(1), 85–93.
Abstract: Over the last decades, speculative investors in the FX market have profited in the well known currency carry trade strategy (CT). However, during currencies or global financial crashes, CT produces substantial losses. In this work we present a methodology that enhances CT performance significantly. For our final strategy, constructed backtests show that the mean-semivolatility ratio can be more than doubled with respect to benchmark CT. To do the latter, we first identify and classify CT returns according to their behavior in different regimes, using a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). The model helps to determine when to open and close positions, depending whether the regime is favorable to CT or not. Finally we employ a mean-semivariance allocation model to improve allocations when positions are opened. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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Reus, L., Munoz, F. D., & Moreno, R. (2018). Retail consumers and risk in centralized energy auctions for indexed long-term contracts in Chile. Energy Policy, 114, 566–577.
Abstract: Centralized energy auctions for long-term contracts are commonly-used mechanisms to ensure supply adequacy, to promote competition, and to protect retail customers from price spikes in Latin America. In Chile, the law mandates that all distribution companies must hold long-term contracts – which are awarded on a competitive centralized auction – to cover 100% of the projected demand from three to fifteen years into the future. These contracts can be indexed to a series of financial parameters, including fossil fuel prices at reference locations. Drawing from portfolio theory, we use a simple example to illustrate the difficulties of selecting, through the current clearing mechanism that focuses on average costs and individual characteristics of the offers, a portfolio of long-term energy contracts that could simultaneously minimize the expected future cost of energy and limit the risk exposure of retail customers. In particular, we show that if the objective of the regulator is to limit the risk to regulated consumers, it could be optimal to include contracts that would not be selected based on individual characteristics of the offers and a least-cost auction objective, but that could significantly reduce the price variance of the overall portfolio due to diversification effects between indexing parameters.
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