Go, R. S., Munoz, F. D., & Watson, J. P. (2016). Assessing the economic value of co-optimized grid-scale energy storage investments in supporting high renewable portfolio standards. Appl. Energy, 183, 902–913.
Abstract: Worldwide, environmental regulations such as Renewable Portfolio Standards (RPSs) are being broadly adopted to promote renewable energy investments. With corresponding increases in renewable energy deployments, there is growing interest in grid-scale energy storage systems (ESS) to provide the flexibility needed to efficiently deliver renewable power to consumers. Our contribution in this paper is to introduce a unified generation, transmission, and bulk ESS expansion planning model subject to an RPS constraint, formulated as a two-stage stochastic mixed-integer linear program (MILP) optimization model, which we then use to study the impact of co-optimization and evaluate the economic interaction between investments in these three asset classes in achieving high renewable penetrations. We present numerical case studies using the 24-bus IEEE RTS-96 test system considering wind and solar as available renewable energy resources, and demonstrate that up to $180 million/yr in total cost savings can result from the co-optimization of all three assets, relative to a situation in which no ESS investment options are available. Surprisingly, we find that co-optimized bulk ESS investments provide significant economic value through investment deferrals in transmission and generation capacity, but very little savings in operational cost. Finally, we observe that planning transmission and generation infrastructure first and later optimizing ESS investments as is common in industry captures at most 1.7% ($3 million/yr) of the savings that result from co-optimizing all assets simultaneously. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Kristiansen, M., Munoz, F. D., Oren, S., & Korpas, M. (2018). A Mechanism for Allocating Benefits and Costs from Transmission Interconnections under Cooperation: A Case Study of the North Sea Offshore Grid. Energy J., 39(6), 209–234.
Abstract: We propose a generic mechanism for allocating the benefits and costs that result from the development of international transmission interconnections under a cooperative agreement. The mechanism is based on a planning model that considers generation investments as a response to transmission developments, and the Shapley Value from cooperative game theory. This method provides a unique allocation of benefits and costs considering each country's average incremental contribution to the cooperative agreement. The allocation satisfies an axiomatic definition of fairness. We demonstrate our results for three planned transmission interconnections in the North Sea and show that the proposed mechanism can be used as a basis for defining a set of Power Purchase Agreements among countries. This achieves the desired final distribution of economic benefits and costs from transmission interconnections as countries trade power over time. We also show that, in this case, the proposed allocation is stable.
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