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Nasirov, S., Cruz, E., Agostini, C. A., & Silva, C. (2019). Policy Makers' Perspectives on the Expansion of Renewable Energy Sources in Chile's Electricity Auctions. Energies, 12(21), 17 pp.
Abstract: Chile has become one of the first few countries where renewable sources compete directly with conventional generation in price-based auctions. Moreover, the results of energy auctions during the last few years show a remarkable transition from conventional fossil fuels to renewable energies. In fact, the energy auction in 2017, to provide energy to customers from distribution companies, achieved a massive expansion in renewable technology at one of the lowest prices in the world. These positive results prompted the question if such results were permanent or temporal due to factors with limited effects. In this regard, this paper studies the key factors that drove the significant rise of renewable technologies in Chilean energy auctions, obtaining valuable lessons for regulators, not only in Chile, but also in the region and the world. For this purpose, we considered a well-proven method based on a hybrid multicriteria decision-making model to examine and prioritize the main drivers of the expansion of renewables in auctions. The results showed that some specific characteristics of the auction design, particularly the hourly supply blocks, the lead time for project construction, and contract duration, were the most significant drivers for the expansion of renewables in energy auctions. Moreover, the results showed that, provided that the auction design accommodates for such drivers, solar energy ends up as the most attractive technology in the Chilean auctions. The research also shows the main findings are robust by the application of a probabilistic sensitivity analysis.
Keywords: renewable energy; auctions; regulator's perspective; Chile
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Reus, L., Munoz, F. D., & Moreno, R. (2018). Retail consumers and risk in centralized energy auctions for indexed long-term contracts in Chile. Energy Policy, 114, 566–577.
Abstract: Centralized energy auctions for long-term contracts are commonly-used mechanisms to ensure supply adequacy, to promote competition, and to protect retail customers from price spikes in Latin America. In Chile, the law mandates that all distribution companies must hold long-term contracts – which are awarded on a competitive centralized auction – to cover 100% of the projected demand from three to fifteen years into the future. These contracts can be indexed to a series of financial parameters, including fossil fuel prices at reference locations. Drawing from portfolio theory, we use a simple example to illustrate the difficulties of selecting, through the current clearing mechanism that focuses on average costs and individual characteristics of the offers, a portfolio of long-term energy contracts that could simultaneously minimize the expected future cost of energy and limit the risk exposure of retail customers. In particular, we show that if the objective of the regulator is to limit the risk to regulated consumers, it could be optimal to include contracts that would not be selected based on individual characteristics of the offers and a least-cost auction objective, but that could significantly reduce the price variance of the overall portfolio due to diversification effects between indexing parameters.
Keywords: Price risk; Energy auctions; Portfolio optimization
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